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ARTICLES IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR L. RAY PAT=ERSON
INTRODUCTION1
L. RAY PATTERSON: COPYRIGHT (AND ITS
MASTER) IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Craig Joyce2




During a long and distinguished career, L. Ray Patterson, Pope Brock
Professor at the University of Georgia School of Law, has been called many
things-most of them complimentary!4
No one else-not even Benjamin Kaplan, Mel Nimmer or Alan Latman, those
other Masters of Copyright with whom Ray rightly can be compared-has had
The following remarks were solicited as the Introduction to this Symposium issue and
delivered by the author at the Annual Banquet of the JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
in Athens, Georgia, on April 17, 2003.
2 Law Foundation Professor, and Co-Director of the Institute for Intellectual Property &
Information Law, University of Houston Law Center. Joyce is the lead author of the widely adopted
casebook, Copyright Law (6th ed. 2003, with Marshall Leaffer, Peter Jaszi and Tyler Ochoa), and,
most recently, edited THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURTJUSTICE
(2003), by Sandra Day O'Connor.
Personal Use in Copynght Law: An Unrecognized Constitutional Right (forthcoming).
Delicacy precludes mention here of the oft-muttered imprecations of the latter-day
descendants of the Stationers' Company whom Professor Patterson has dubbed "copyrightists," and
whom he has skewered at every turn. They will want to read no farther herel
1
Joyce: Introduction - L. Ray Patterson: Copyright (and Its Master) in Hi
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2003
J. INTELL PROP. L [Vol:10:239
an annual "Copyright Hero" award named after him, and by no less a symbol of
the centrality of learning in our society than the American Library Association.5
In presenting the first "L. Ray Patterson Award: In Support of Users' Rights"
to none other than L. Ray Patterson in 2002, Lawrence Lessig of Stanford6
referred to Professor Patterson simply as "our model."'
Lolly Gasaway of North Carolina' called him "a courtly Southem gentleman"
whose looks "mask the fact that he is the most radical of copyright scholars."9
David Lange of Duke" described Professor Patterson as "the conscience of
the copyright movement," whose "calls for restraint in the relentless extension of
protection have never flagged," and whose "courage and good cheer in the teeth
of resistance and indifference have never wavered.""
Kenneth Crews of Indiana, 2 noting Professor Patterson's "erudition, honesty,
and compassion," described him as a "good son of the South" who, for more
than thirty-five years, "has stood unhesitatingly before students, peers, the public,
lawyers and librarians, and even Congress and the courts, to tell them as a
gentleman and a scholar his honest views about the mistakes all of them are
making when the subject turns to copyright.' 13
And Peter Jaszi of American 4 tellingly identified L. Ray Patterson as both a
"scholar" whose work has "inspired a generation of scholars-and withstood the
s Information regarding the American Library Association's presentation of the "L. Ray
Patterson Award: In Support of Users' Rights" to Professor Patterson at its Annual Conference in
June of 2002 can be found on the Web at: www.info-commons.org/feature.html.
6 Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, and Founder and Director of the
Stanford Center for Internet and Society.
7 E-mail from Carrie Russell, Copyright Specialist for the American Library Association's Office
for Information Technology Policy to the author (July 1, 2002) titled ALA Honors L Ray Patterson
with Award at AnnualMeeting, taken from the Library Journal Academic Newswire, an c-newsletter
service (on file with the author). Information on the LibraryJournal Academic newswire is available
at http://www.libraryjoumal.com/newswire/subscribe.asp (last visited April 23, 2003).
8 Laura Gasaway, Director of the Law Library and Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law.
9 Lolly Gasaway,L RqyPatterson:A Tribute, http://www.info-commons.org/gasaway.htm (last
visited April 16, 2003).
'o David Lange, Professor of Law, Duke University Law School.
"' David Lange, L Ray Patkrnon.A Tribute, www.info-commons.org/lange.html (last visited April
16, 2003).
12 Kenneth D. Crews, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, and
Director, Copyright Management Center based at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
(UPUI).
13 Kenneth D. Crews, L Ray Patterson: A Tribute, www.info-commons.org/crews.html (last
visited April 16, 2003).
14 Peter Jaszi, Professor of Law, and Director, Glushki-Samuelson Intellectual Property Law
Clinic, Washington College of Law, American University.
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test of that new generation's inquiry," and as an "activist" whose books and
elegantly crafted articles (which Jaszi describes as "almost too good" for the
traditional law reviews) have "made visible the hidden tectonic shift" that
occurred with the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 and "sketched a
persuasive basis for constitutional reevaluation" of the developments since.15
What label, then, best describes Ray Patterson? Model? Scholar? Activist?
Radical? Perhaps, before answering, we should take a few steps back in time to
observe the journey that is Professor Patterson's life in copyright.
The centerpiece of that journey, and also its beginning, was Ray's magisterial
study of the history, and pre-history, of Anglo-American copyright, Copyright in
Historical Perspective, published in 1968 by Vanderbilt University Press. It is the
seminal work in our field-and the key to understanding both Ray's purpose, and
his achievement, in the three-and-one-half decades of scholarly work he has
erected on that foundation.
You may well ask why a young doctoral candidate at Harvard Law School
might elect as the topic of his dissertation a subject so esoteric as copyright. The
answer, as Ray himself relates, is that a fellow student suggested to him the history
of copyright because "nobody know anything about it." At least, as events
proved, nobody knew much about it.
Professor Patterson claims to have had great difficulty securing approval for
his dissertation at Harvard. It seems that the "Georgia of the North" had no
faculty member sufficiently ready, and willing, to essay the task. Accordingly, the
school decided to go outside its faculty for a reader. The first reader chosen was
a noted bibliographer in London, who proved, however, to be a Communist-a
disqualifying condition at the height of the Cold War. The second reader died.
In the end, the task fell to the Director of Harvard's rare books library, who
heartily approved the dissertation-which, in due course, became Copyright in
Historical Perspective---and thereby launched Professor Patterson's astonishing
prolific career in academia. 6
Ray's central idea was that copyright is a creature not of natural law but of
positive law,--not a proprietary right, but a species of trade regulation. The charter
granted by Philip and Mary to the Guild of Stationers-the booksellers of
London-in 1556 included power, administered by the booksellers themselves,
15 Peter Jaszi, L Rqy Patterson: A Tribute, www.info-commons.org/jaszi.htnl (last visited April
16,2003).
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to regulate privately all trade in books. Here, then, is one of the many ironies of
copyright that Professor Patterson has brought to our attention over the years.
Although today we regard copyright as the law of culture and learning, its pre-
statutory antecedent was created by and for tradespeople. As Copyngbtin Historical
Perspective amply demonstrated, the booksellers were more concerned with profit
than the promotion of knowledge, and the regime they created reflected that fact.
For the stationers' copyright was an exclusive right to publish books-the
manuscripts of which the booksellers merely purchased from authors without
contributing a whit of originality themselves-and its term was forever.
The reason why the sovereigns granted so much power to so small a group of
tradesmen-the Stationers' Charter named but ninety-seven grantees-was the
religious controversy spawned by Henry VIII when he broke with Rome.
Thereafter, the sovereign, whether Catholic (Mary) or Protestant (Elizabeth I),
believed that the security of the throne depended upon preventing the people
from reading schismatical, heretical, seditious, or treasonable matter. Preventing
the publication of such material made desirable, if not necessary, the printers and
publishers as allies. The stationers' copyright was thus supported by the Star
Chamber decrees of censorship and, finally, by the Licensing Act of 1662.17 But
when the Glorious Revolution of 1688 resolved the religious controversy in
England and assured the Protestant succession, these measures ceased to have any
function other than protecting the booksellers' monopoly. In 1694, Parliament
allowed the Licensing Act to lapse for all time.
What followed in 1710 was the Statute of Anne."8 That legislation created for
the first time a statutory law of copyright and, as Copyright in Historical Perspective
brilliantly demonstrates, provided an entirely new regime of trade regulation
dramatically different from the stationers' copyright. Parliament set about to
restore order to the book trade, and to provide reasonable returns in support of
authors' economic interests in their creations,"' without continuing the monopoly
'7 13 & 14 Car. II, c. 33 (Eng.).
'8 Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710,8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.).
19 The Statute ofAnn: Copyight MiscomnIred, 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 223 (1966), published three years
after submission of Professor Patterson's dissertation but two years before the dissertation appeared
in book form as COPYRIGHT IN HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, first made the point in print that the
Statute of Anne was not enacted primarily for the benefit of authors:
[Clopyright is an author's right only in a limited sense.
An author has two basic interests in his works, an economic interest and a
creative interest, and it is the former alone which statutory copyright protects.
The economic interest is the one the author shares with the publisher. Since
copyright protects only the owner, when the publisher becomes the copyright
owner, which is the usual case, the copyright protects the publisher rather than
the author. Thus, copyright can be properly viewed as being in fact a publisher's
right more than an author's right.
[Vo1:10:239
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on publication which, protected by press regulation, had become so comprehen-
sive as to place all printed works under the stationers' ownership and preclude the
development of a public domain.
To avoid this problem, the legislators transformed copyright from a plenag
property right that inhibited learning into a limited competitive right that promoted
learning.
The title of the Statute of Anne not only stated the goal ("An Act for the
Encouragement of Learning"), but also stated the means. Copyright was to be
limited to the right to print and vend published works ("Vesting the Copies of
Printed Books'), was to be vested initially in the authors of books ("in the
Authors or Purchasers of such Copies"), and was to exist only for a limited time
("during the Times therein mentioned").
Remarkably, in only twenty-seven words, Parliament created three policies of
copyright so important and so fundamental that the Founders of our own nation
adopted them for the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution ° the encourage-
ment of learning (because the title of the Statute of Anne so stated); public access
(because copyright was limited to published works); and the creation and
enhancement of the public domain (because copyright was available only for new
works and was to exist only for limited times).
All this and more-including the famous contests in Millarv. Taylor,2 the 1769
decision in which the booksellers convinced the King's Bench to adopt their
natural law theory of copyright, and Donaldron v. Beckett,22 the 1774 House of
Lords decision repudiating Millar and embracing definitively the positive law
theory of the Statute of Anne; the twelve state copyright statutes in pre-
constitutional America; the saga of the Copyright Clause itself; the Copyright Act
of 1790,' which operationalized the positive law, limited right theory of copyright in
the United States; and Wheaton v. Peters,24 the Supreme Court's great decision
vindicating that theory in this country, one would have hoped, for all time-you
will find in Copyright in Historical Perspective.
Ray's masterwork is, in every sense, a classic. Its conclusions were stunningly
original, in the very best copyright sense of that word. It has remained in print
longer than most people in this room have been alive. And it has stood the test
of time and succeeding scholarship, for much of which it has been the touch-
stone. Indeed, the publication of Copyright in Historical Perspective may well be the
Id at 224.
'o U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21 4 Burr. (4th ed.) 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769) (an anti-Statute of Anne decision).
22 4 Burr. (4th ed.) 2408, 2417, 98 Eng. Rep. 257, 262 (H.L. 1774) (a pro-Statute of Anne
decision).
" Act of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).
24 34 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
2003]
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single most important non-legislative, non-judicial event in contemporary
American copyright jurisprudence.
Ray, of course, has had much to say in the intervening years. Nor has he had
a shortage on new ideas along the way. It seems fair, in fact, to characterize
Professor Patterson as one of the most original thinkers that the Groves of
Academe have produced in this country-an appropriate quality for a student of
copyright. Here is but a brief sampling of ideas from his post-1968 oeuvre.
Copyright... is not a right of ownership in a given work, but a
right, or series of rights, to which a given work is subject... [Whether or
not decision makers grasp this distinction] has a great deal of impact
on the scope of control [they conclude] a copyright proprietor
[should] have over a copyrighted work."
To give communications corporations aproprietay interest inpublic
information andpublic domain materials would enhance their power to
influence and shape the opinions of millions of people without any
means of making them accountable for the responsible exercise of
this enormous power.
The law of copyright can be viewed most usefully as statutory unfair
competition based on the misappropriation rationale. The law's
function is to protect the copyrighted work against predatory
competitive practices.... [It follows that the basic constitutional
purpose of copyright-promotion of learning-is best served [not
by encouraging the creation of works but] by encouraging [their]
distribution.
The originality requirement in copyright law is constitutionaly
mandated for all works.2
8
2s L. Ray Patterson, Private Copyight and Pubic Communication: Fre Speech Endangered, 28 VAND.
L REv. 1161, 1209 (1975) (emphasis added).
26 Id at 1168 (emphasis added). A scathing critique of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
in draft? No. A commentary on then-pending provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 concerning
television!.
" L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyight, andFair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1,6-7 (1987) (emphasis
added).
28 L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopohng the Law: The Scope of Copyight Protecion for Law
Reportt andStatutog Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 763 n.155 (1989) (emphasis added), cited in
Feist Pubcations, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
[Vo1:10:239
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[P]ersonal use has been a part of American copyright law from the
beginning.... To subject to restraints the use that an individual
may make of a copyrighted work after it has been publicly dissemi-
nated would be contrary to the basic purpose of copyright, which
is intended to facilitate the learning process.'
[Thanks to new communications technology, today] copyright
owners are asserting a proprietary control of copyrighted works to
an unparalleled extent... The primary intellectual weapon against
this onslaught is the fair use doctrine.... Fair use[, however,] ...
should apply only to the copyright owner's competitive use of the
copyright. It should not be used to restrict the right of personal
use-the individual's use of the work, for his or her learning °3
[C] opyright law is overextended... The copyright statute today...
[protects information from the public domain] far removed from
the "writings" of "authors" that the Constitution empowers
Congress to protect.... Therefore, it is desirable to remove low-
authorship works [protected by what Professor Patterson calls "neo-
copyright] from the copyright statute and protect them with a
[federal] trade regulation act... [affording] only limited protection
against competitors, not plenary protection against users.3
While profit is not a four-letter word in terms of the free-market
system,... a statutory guarantee of profit [poses] great risk to the
public welfare. ... The Constitution . . . imposes duties on the
copyright owner that require him or her to validate the statutory
permission to intrude upon the public domain for private profit....
[We must ensure] that copyright owners do not change their
temporary easement into a fee-simple ownership of the public
domain. 2
[C]opyright can properly be viewed only as a three-part concept which
must serve the interest ofthreegroupr, authors, entrepreneurs, and users.
Each has a legitimate interest in copyrighted works-authors in
reputation and monetary gain, entrepreneurs in profit, and users in
learning. Each group thus has a legitimate claim to consideration
29 L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS'
RIGHTS 195-96 (1991) (emphasis added).
o L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 265-66 (1992)
(emphasis added).
3' L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended- A Prekminay Inquiy into the Need for a Federal Statute
of Unfair Competition, 17 DAYTON L. REV. 385-87 (1992) (emphasis added).
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by the others because the goals are interrelated, and the rights
leading to those goals must be kept in proportion."
[W]hile copyright protects the author's exclusive right topublish,
the First Amendment protects the citizen's right to read what is
published. . . . MIhere can be no complete understanding of
copyright law without an understanding of [that] relationship .... 34
[C]opyright is ... a subset ofpublic domain law.... [But] the law of
the public domain is underdeveloped... The reason is that...
[t]he public domain designates material owned by everyone and thus
by no one... [But] freedom of speech depends in a large measure
upon the existence of a public domain. 5
[A] necessary condition for courts to fulfill their role as the
protector of copyright is recognition of the fact that the limitationsin the copyright clause govern the courts in applying copyrght statutes as
well as to Congress in enacting them. A copyright statute is not entitled
to a presumption of validity and courts must examine its constitu-
tionality de novo.36
And, most recently, here are twin comments by Professor Patterson on the
events of October 27 and 28, 1998, when, on successive days, Congress enacted
the Copyright Term Extension Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act on
what Ray might well describe as "two days that will live in infamy":
[Ihe CTEA serves the interest of no one except.., copyright
holders.., and their heirs.... In terms of scope, copyright can be
viewed as a horizontal monopoy, in terms of time, copyright can be
viewed as a verticalmonopoy. In combination, the result is to enhance
the copyright monopoly in geometric, not arithmetic, terms. That is
why the CTEA is so harmful to the public welfare. 
37
'Ihe... DMCA ... exemplifies the core issue of copyright in the
new millennium-the conflict betweenproperty rights andpoliticalrights...
5 Id at 41.
SL. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. BirchJr., Copyright and Frre Speech Rights, 4J. INTELL. PROP. L.
1, 2 (1996) (emphasis added).
" L. Ray Patterson, The Worst Intellectual Propery Opinion Ever Written: Folsom v. Marsh and Its
Ltgagy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 444 (1998) (emphasis added).
3 L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPR. Soc. U.S.A. 365, 396 (2000)
(emphasis added) (article cited with approval in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 2003 U.S. LEXIS *751, *810
(2003) (Breyer, J. dissenting)).
37 L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Exampk of the Law of Unintended Consequences, 8J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 223, 224, 239 (2001) (emphasis added).
[Vo1:10:239
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just as copyright was a device of public censorship in seventeenth-
century England, the DMCA is a device of private censorship in the
[twenty-first]-century U.S." []he Digital Millennium Copyright
Act... of 1998 in the United States is [simply] a modem version of
the Licensing Act of 1662 in England. 9
There is, of course, much, much more. Professor Patterson's piece in the
present issue of the JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, What's Wrong
with Eldred? An Essay on CoyrigbtJurisprudence,4o more than ably speaks for itself.
And his most recent piece with me, Copyright in 1791: An Essay, 4 arguing that the
widely supposed "conflict" between the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment is an artifact of insufficient knowledge concerning the common
origins of those two provisions of the Constitution, will be in the hands of a
waiting world soon enough.
Suffice it to say here that reading Ray Patterson's work is both a joy, because
of the sheer elegance of his writing, and a revelation, because doing so is a
constant process of enlightenment.
Ray's role in the creation of ideas, and then setting them before us for our
instruction, can be compared to the child in Hans Christian Andersen's "The
Emperor's New Clothes." Like the child who pointed out that the Emperor had
no clothes, Professor Patterson continually points out to readers-and, I have no
doubt, to his students as well-that commonly accepted ideas are not always
logically sound: for example, that the phrase "to Promote the Progress of
Science" in the Copyright Clause is window dressing if it is merely recited, but
without underlying substantive content.
Recall that, in the fairy tale, the fraud by the swindling weavers was based on
their claim that one who could not see the magnificent cloth they did not weave
was unfit for office. Ray's instruction to us is that the latter-day descendants of
the booksellers, mimicking those weavers, claim that authors deserve copyright
as a matter of natural law, that their entitlement should last at least until the end
s L Ray Patterson, Copiright in the New Millennium: Resoling the Conftt between Property Rights and
PoticalR'gbts, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 703-04 (2001) (emphasis added).
'9 L. Ray Patterson, The DMCA: A Modern Version of the Licensing Act of 1662, 10 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1 (2002).
o L. Ray Patterson, What's Wrong With Eldred? An Essay on Copyright Jursprudence, 10J. ITEmL.
PROP. L. 345 (2003).
41 L. Ray Patterson, Copyrght in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyti ht Power




Joyce: Introduction - L. Ray Patterson: Copyright (and Its Master) in Hi
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2003
J. INTELL PROP. L[
of civilization (if not of time itself),42 and that anyone who does not agree is unfit
to comment.
One can, of course, carry the analogy too far, but the similarity of the claim of
a magnificent non-existing cloth to the claim of an all-encompassing non-existing
natural law copyright is not to be dismissed lightly, as Professor Patterson so
often has reminded us. As his example teaches so eloquently, ideas-and the
courage to propound them--can matter profoundly.
I would like, finally, to answer the question I posed at the beginning. What
should we call Ray Patterson? Of all of the titles we might bestow on him, every
scholar in the present issue of the JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
who has learned at his feet, and every student who has attended one of his classes
for the past forty years now, would agree on the label I propose tonight. In
everything he has written over the years, and in every classroom he has graced
with charm and wit and erudition and conviction, Ray Patterson has been above
all, and to all, a teacber.
And so, a toast: To PROFESSOR PATTERSON. Copyright Hero. Model.
Scholar. Activist. Radical. Teacher. And may I add with the greatest pride on
this very special occasion: Friend.
42 Recall that the CTEA was named after a Member of Congress, who, the legislative history
records, "wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever." 144 Cong. Rec. H9952 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono).
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